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OBERGEFELL’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY
CATHERINE SMITH*

INTRODUCTION
1

Obergefell v. Hodges will take its rightful place among landmark civil rights
cases. The blockbuster gay-rights decision, however, also represents the
Supreme Court’s missed opportunity to balance the scales of justice in favor of
another group—children.
The Obergefell Court was presented with the necessary components—
injury-in-fact and well-established legal precedent—to place the interests of
2
children at the center of its analysis, instead of at the margins. It was a
disappointing, albeit expected, omission, because children’s legal interests are
usually sidelined by an unyielding obsession with the interests of adults in our
3
society.
Yet, there is hope for children’s rights advocates. With existing equal
protection law precedent and Obergefell’s legitimate concern for addressing the
social, economic, and psychological harm to children, there is a window of
opportunity to advance children’s equal protection rights in future cases.
This article is not advocating only for the interests of children of same-sex
couples; it is advancing an argument that the legal precedent (the child-centered
cases) that Obergefell omitted is part of a larger civil rights platform. Often, as
the cases herein will document, the children of parents who are members of
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Zoe Jane Smith-Holladay, Eleanor Lucile Newlin-Guerrero, Oscar Newlin-Guerrero, and their peers
whose parents do not conform to the socially constructed norms of the “nuclear family.”
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220, 230 (1982) (finding the denial of education to
children of undocumented children violated equal protection); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968)
(holding state law that denied wrongful death recovery to children because mother was not married
violated equal protection). For a list of injuries to children of same-sex parents, see Brief for Scholars of
the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1088972.
3. The Supreme Court has recognized children’s constitutional protections in a number of
contexts, including due process rights in juvenile proceedings, reproductive freedoms, the freedom of
expression, and equal protection law. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence:
Children As Heroes in the Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1567, 1577 (2009). Sam Castic, The
Irrationality of a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples, MOD Am.,
Summer–Fall 2007, at 7–8 (“To the extent that the plight of the children of same-sex couples is
addressed, it is done as a secondary matter.”).
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marginalized groups—children of color, children of undocumented parents,
children of gays and lesbians, and children of poor parents—bear the brunt of
state practices that seek to penalize kids in order to regulate adult behavior.
Part I of this article delineates the harms to children from marriage bans,
harms that the Obergefell Court relied upon to recognize the fundamental right
to marry for same-sex couples. Part II explains how Obergefell missed an
opportunity to advance the constitutional rights of children by failing to invoke
4
well-established equal protection law. This discussion briefly catalogues the
omitted child-centered cases that warranted a more robust analysis of children’s
rights. This series of cases begins with the Brown v. Board of Education
decision, and then turns to a number of post-Brown equal protection cases that
explicitly prohibited state practices that penalized nonmarital children and
children of undocumented parents because of the conduct of their parents. With
this historical backdrop, it is easier to understand that the same-sex marriage
bans were another iteration of government practices that punish children—this
5
time, children of gays and lesbians seeking to marry. Part III explains that
despite the Obergefell Court’s failure to advance the equal protection rights of
6
children of same-sex parents, there is reason to be optimistic. The opinion, by
acknowledging the harms to children as relevant to their parents’ constitutional
claims, indirectly bolsters some of the central themes from these earlier cases. It
also demonstrates at least some empathy for the plight of kids. To conclude, the
article briefly offers three central themes from this collection of cases that are
important to a renewed discussion on the rights of children.
I
THE HARMS TO CHILDREN OF GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS SEEKING TO
MARRY
Obergefell v. Hodges made same-sex marriage the law of the land, striking
down marriage bans and nonrecognition laws as infringements on the
fundamental right of gays and lesbians under the Due Process Clause of the
7
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, missed a rare

4. Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents: Challenging the
Three Pillars of Exclusion—Legitimacy, Dual Gender Parenting, and Biology, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307 319
(2010) (“It is rare for advocates to advance—and for courts to consider—the potential rights and
remedies of actual children of gay and lesbian couples. . . .”). This was true for same-sex marriage wars
and it is in fact true across the board when it comes to children.
5. See Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1589 (2013).
6. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (containing no citation to the equal protection children’s rights
cases). But the majority in Obergefell hinted at the precedent by recognizing that the children’s injuries
were through “no fault” of their own. Id. at 2600. See generally Catherine E. Smith and Susannah W.
Pollvogt, Children as Proto-Citizens: Equal Protection, Citizenship, and Lessons From the ChildCentered Cases, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 655, 659 (2014) (“[W]hile courts have recognized the
significance of harm to children as a factual matter, they have yet to address its significant as a legal
matter.”).
7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608–09.
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opportunity to recognize the equal protection rights of children as a separate
8
and distinct constitutional claim based on injury-in fact and legal precedent
First, the harms.
9
State marriage bans harmed children of same-sex couples in four ways.
First, they foreclosed the main route to family formation for children of samesex couples. In most jurisdictions children born into heterosexual marriages are
presumed to be the child of the marriage and this presumption establishes a
legal relationship with both parents, even if the child is not biologically related
to them. For same-sex couples in marriage ban states, biology (or a legal
adoption) established a legal relationship between the child and one of its same10
sex parents; however, the bans precluded the formation of a legal relationship
between the child and her other, non-biological (or non-adoptive) parent. In
many marriage ban states, it was impossible for a child of same-sex parents to
establish a legal relationship with her non-biological (or non-adoptive) parent;
11
they were permanent legal strangers. As the Obergefell majority recognized in
describing the legal conundrum of Michigan co-plaintiffs, April DeBoer and
Jayne Rowse, who were raising three adopted children, “Michigan . . . permits
only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt, so each child
12
can have only one woman as his or her legal parent.”
Second, marriage bans coupled with nonrecognition laws voided existing
legal parent-child relationships. Non-recognition laws—state laws that refused
to recognize married same-sex couples from other states—created uncertainty
for children of same-sex parents when their families moved from one state to
another. In a marriage equality state, the child’s relationship to both her parents
would be legally recognized; in a non-recognition state, like Michigan, the
child’s relationship with her non-biological (non-adoptive) parent would be
13
void.
Third, marriage bans denied children of same-sex couples’ economic rights
and benefits that would stem from a legal relationship with their non-biological
parent, including workers’ compensation benefits, social security benefits, and
14
wrongful death proceeds. They also deprived the child and her parents of
8. See Smith, supra note 5 (“A child of same-sex parents denied a government benefit has a
cognizable equal protection challenge – a legal claim that is separate and distinct from that of the
child’s gay and lesbian parents.”); Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 2 ([A]mici’s analysis, focusing on the equal protection rights
of children, provides an independent basis for evaluating the constitutionality of the state marriage
bans.”).
9. Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 2.
10 The term “parent” is used here in its social and informal connotation, not as a legal term.
11. Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 27.
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
13. Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 22–27.
14. Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 27. For a more in-depth discussion of the range of economic benefits, see
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certainty or consistency in treatment when unexpected events or crises
occurred. The Obergefell majority, once again, explained the conundrum for
children of same-sex couples seeking to marry: “if an emergency were to arise,
schools and hospitals may treat the children as if they had only one parent.
And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have no
15
legal rights over the child she had not been permitted to adopt.” In addition,
the lack of a legal relationship to the non-biological parent also placed the child
at risk in the event her parents separated or divorced because of the lack of
16
access to child support or a custody arrangement.
Fourth, marriage bans inflicted psychological and stigmatic harm to children
of same-sex parents by “symbolically expressing the inferiority of families
17
headed by same-sex couples and the children in those families.”
The Supreme Court recognized these harms for the first time in United
18
States v. Windsor. In striking down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the
Court explained that “[t]he differentiation [between same-sex couples and
opposite-sex couples] brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples”
and “it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex
19
couples” The Court also acknowledged the financial injury that the federal
marriage ban inflicted on children.
DOMA . . . brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the costs of
health care to families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their
workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon
20
the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are integral to family security.

Consistent with Windsor, the Obergefell majority also recognized the
psychological and material harms to children of same-sex parents as an
important consideration in extending the fundamental right to marry to same21
sex couples. The Obergefell Court recognized that the right to marry has long
been considered a fundamental right and that the previous cases establishing
the right dealt only with opposite-sex couples. In response to the states’
arguments that gays and lesbians were claiming a new and nonexistent right to
“same-sex marriage,” the Court made clear that the relevant inquiry required a
more comprehensive approach to determine if there is a sufficient reason to
exclude a class of people from the right to marry. The Court offered four
principles for why the right to marry has been protected: (1) To allow for
Smith, supra, note 5 at 1603–1606.
15. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2595.
16. Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 27; Smith, supra note 5, at 1604.
17. Id. at 29.
18. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). See Brief for the Scholars of the Constitutional
Rights of Children In Support of Respondent Edith Windsor Addressing The Merits and Supporting
Affirmance (2013)
19. Id. at 2694.
20. Id. at 2695 (internal citation omitted)
21. The Obergefell dissent made no reference to the injuries or rights of children of same-sex
couples.
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individual autonomy in areas of intimate life; (2) to support a unique “twoperson union” through which to find expression, intimacy, and spirituality; (3)
to offer safeguards for children; and (4) to maintain the country’s democratic
22
social order. The majority found that same-sex couples and their children were
no different than opposite-sex couples when it came to these abiding
23
principles.
The Obergefell Court’s recognition of the harms and interests of children is
noteworthy; however, it did fall short of a transformative or pivotal paradigm
shift on behalf of children and their rights to equal protection. The marriage
bans enacted as part of a state campaign to stem the gay rights movement’s
push for marriage equality provided an example of state actors penalizing
24
children to regulate adult conduct. Through these bans, governments treated
similarly situated children differently because they did not agree with their
parents’ conduct or status as gays and lesbians. As the next part explains, such
government conduct defies well-established equal protection precedent; law
that the Obergefell Court failed to invoke.
II
THE LEGAL PRECEDENT OBERGEFELL OMITTED: THE CHILD-CENTERED
CASES
The Obergefell Court recognized the harms to children of same-sex parents
as a factual matter, yet it ignored precedent. Well-established equal protection
law establishes that it is impermissible for the government to treat some
children differently than other children because of the moral disdain of their
parents’ conduct. This precedent begins with Brown v. Board of Education, a
case also about children.
A. Brown v. Board of Education: A Turning Point for Children’s Rights
As observed by Professor Homer H. Clarke, Jr., “[T]here is nothing in the
25
Constitution about children, minors or infants, or parents for that matter.” He
also observed that the interests of children were not present in the Civil War
26
Amendments to the Constitution. Further, as Professor Barbara Woodhouse
explains, “Historically, children were objects, and not subjects of the law,
functioning more in the role of parental property than as persons. They were
27
rarely seen as bearers of due process and equal protection rights.” After
28
Brown v. Board of Education, the view of children as property shifted.
22. Id. at 2599–2602.
23. Id.
24. See supra Part I.
25. Homer H. Clarke, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
26. Id.
27. Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 1577. The Supreme Court has recognized children’s constitutional
protections in a number of contexts, including due process rights in juvenile proceedings, reproductive
freedoms, the freedom of expression, and equal protection law.
28. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In Brown, the Supreme Court struck down “separate but equal” racially
29
segregated schools. The Court declared that state-mandated segregation
denied black children educational opportunities and symbolized their
inferiority.
Brown was a turning point for the basic civil rights of African Americans,
30
African-American children, and children in general. A few years later, in In re
31
Gault, the Court recognized that “[n]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor
32
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” And while this “promising bit of dicta
33
has never been fully realized,” the constitutional foothold for children
recognized in Brown and Gault has been critical to the minimal constitutional
34
rights that children have garnered to date.
Brown played a key role in subsequent cases addressing the plight of
children who faced social, legal and economic exclusion, including the historical
unequal treatment of nonmarital children.
B. Levy v. Louisiana and its Progeny—Children and Their Unwed Parents
35

Once viewed as filius nullius or the “child of no one,” children born to
unmarried parents were considered “nonpersons” and denied social and legal
benefits that the federal government offered to marital children as a matter of
course. For example, in 1944, the Virginia Supreme Court denied Jacqueline
Brown’s request for child support from her father, because, consistent with
common law, “a bastard was considered as kin to no one . . . [n]o inheritable
36
blood flowed through [her] veins.” Nonmarital children were socially
ostracized, and denied inheritance, parental support, social security, and other
benefits simply because the state morally disagreed with their parents’
37
behavior.
The exclusion of nonmarital children fell more harshly on AfricanAmerican and poor children, yet attempts to gain traction by incorporating
29. Id. at 483 (holding that segregated schools deprived black children of equal educational
opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
30. See Clarke, supra note 25, at 3 (“Another case not generally considered a children’s rights
case, but one which promised great potential benefits for children, was Brown v. Board of
Education.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and Sarah Rebecca Katz, Martyrs, the Media and the Web:
Examining a Grassroots Children’s Rights Movement Through the Lens of Social Movement Theory, 5
WHITTIER J. OF CHILD AND FAM. ADVOC. 121 (2005).
31. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. Id. at 13.
33. Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 1578.
34. Id.
35. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (“[R]ights [of a nonmarital child] are very
few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of
nobody.”); Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327 n.11 (1969); Benjamin G. Ledsham,
Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based
Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2373 (2007).
36. Brown v. Brown, 32 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1944).
37. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2011).
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their disparate treatment into the larger civil rights movement were
38
unsuccessful. So, advocates chose to try to remedy the disparate impact of
“illegitimacy” laws by arguing that the exclusion of nonmarital children was an
equal protection violation itself.
39
Decided in 1968, Levy v. Louisiana was the first nonmarital status case to
make its way to the Supreme Court; it changed the social and legal landscape
for nonmarital children. Louise Levy, an unmarried African-American mother
40
died due to medical malpractice. Levy’s five children were prohibited from a
41
“right to recover” because they were born outside of marriage. The Louisiana
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the children’s claim because “morals
and general welfare . . . discourage[] bringing children into the world out of
42
wedlock.”
43
The Supreme Court struck down the Louisiana law. The Court found that
44
the children’s “illegitimate” status was unrelated to the mother’s injury. Thus,
45
Levy found that it was “invidious” discrimination to deny them recovery.
Brown was highlighted as an example of the Court being “extremely sensitive
when it comes to basic civil rights,” and not “hesitat[ing] to strike down [an]
46
invidious classification[] even though it had history and tradition on its side.”
Levy, in reliance on the tenets of Brown, changed the social and legal landscape
47
for nonmarital children.
A few years later the Supreme Court again held that a state may not place
its moral objection of parental conduct at the feet of the child by withholding
48
government benefits. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Court
overturned another Louisiana law that denied workers’ compensation benefits
49
to a deceased worker’s children born outside of the marriage.

38. See Smith, supra note 5, at 1609; Martha Davis, Male Coverture and the Illegitimate Family, 56
Rutgers L. Rev. 73, 90 (2003).
39. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
40. Id.
41. John C. Gray & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana
and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1969).
42. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (quoting Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967)); Gray &
Rudovsky, supra note 41, at 3.
43. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
44. Id.; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (finding the denial of education to children
of undocumented children violated equal protection); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73, 76 (1968) (invalidating a Louisiana statute that barred recovery for damages to the mother of an
illegitimate child, while allowing recovery to the parents of a “legitimate” child under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
45. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
46. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
47. Brief for Appellee at 15, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112826
(citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)); Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the
Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 93–94, 96 (2003).
48. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
49. Id. at 175–76.
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Henry Clyde Stokes died from work-related injuries. Stokes’s marital and
nonmarital children, all of whom lived in the same household with him, filed
50
workers’ compensation claims for their father’s death. Under Louisiana
51
workers’ compensation law, however, “unacknowledged” that nonmarital
52
children” were not treated the same as children born to married parents. They
could not recover if the surviving dependents in line before them exhausted the
53
maximum benefits. As expected, the four marital children were awarded the
maximum allowable amount, leaving the two nonmarital children with
54
nothing. The U.S. Supreme Court found the law treated nonmarital children
55
differently than marital ones and was “impermissible discrimination.” The
Court reasoned, “An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much
from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegitimate later
56
acknowledged.” To penalize the child would place the child at an economic
disadvantage for the parents’ acts over which the child has no control. This kind
of punishment bespeaks an invidious animus not a legitimate governmental
purpose.
From 1968 to 1986, the Supreme Court heard more than a dozen cases on
the rights of nonmarital children, ultimately extending intermediate scrutiny to
classifications that treated them differently than those born to married
57
couples. These cases also influenced the equal protection law on the rights of
58
children of undocumented persons.
C. Plyler v. Doe—Children and Their Undocumented Parents
59

In Plyler v. Doe, school-aged children of Mexican origin challenged on
equal protection grounds a Texas statute that withheld state funds from local
50. Id. at 165–66.
51. Id. at 167–68. It was not possible for Stokes, the father in Weber, to acknowledge his two
children because Louisiana law prohibited acknowledgment of children whose parents were incapable
of marrying at the time of conception. At the time of conception Stokes remained married to Jones,
thus making it impossible for him to marry Weber. Id. at 171 n.9.
52. Id. at 167–68 (noting that the Louisiana law allowed “legitimate children and acknowledged
illegitimates” equal recovery, while relegating “unacknowledged illegitimate children” to a lesser
status).
53. Id. at 168.
54. Id. at 167.
55. Id. at 169.
56. Id.
57. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that Pennsylvania statute was
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam).
For further discussion of the nonmarital status cases, see Smith, supra note 5, at 1608–15.
58. I am tracking the court’s language here; however, I believe that there is more to explore in this
idea that children are targeted because of the moral disdain of their parents’ conduct. After reviewing a
number of cases, this could also be characterized in different ways. In fact, it could be that children are
targeted because of the political unpopularity of their parents and that unpopularity could stem from a
number of things—behavior viewed as immoral, racial or ethnic identity, immigration status, sexual
orientation, and other reasons.
59. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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school districts that chose to enroll and educate children not “legally admitted”
60
to the United States. The Supreme Court held that excluding children from a
61
public education because of their undocumented status was unconstitutional.
Relying on the nonmarital status cases, the Court made a distinction
between adults who were undocumented in the United States as a result of their
62
own conduct and their children. The Court explained that the children “can
63
neither affect their parents’ conduct nor their own status,” and to legislate
64
against them would not be consistent with basic notions of justice.
The Court went on to say,
[M]ore is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether [the statute]
discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. [The
statute] imposes a lifetime of hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable
for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that
65
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.

The Plyler Court was intensely aware of the ills of imposing a discriminating
66
burden on a child who has no control over his or her undocumented status.
Brown, Levy, Weber, and Plyler offer significant insights into the rights of
children. Further, despite omitting this legal precedent, Obergefell does express
concern for the social, psychological, and economic harms to the children of
same-sex couples in its decision to extend constitutional protections to same-sex
couples seeking to marry. In fact, Obergefell itself hinted at this line of
precedent, without citation, by recognizing that children of same-sex parents
were denied the benefits of marriage “through no fault of their own.”
III
IMPORTANT EQUAL PROTECTION VALUES DERIVED FROM THE CHILDCENTERED CASES
The child-centered cases challenge the notion that some children are worthy
of economic, and social safeguards, while others are not because of what boils
down to their status as children of adults who are characterized by government
actors as “immoral.”
These cases have been viewed as “unique,” limited to their factual
circumstances, or unrelated to each other in equal protection lore, but they
need not be. When viewed collectively, they offer important themes or guiding
principles about on the rights of children and equal protection law in general.
60. Id. at 205–06, 209.
61. Id. at 230. Of note, the Court first found that undocumented children are “persons” within the
meaning of Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 210.
62. Id. at 220.
63. Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id. at 219–220.
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Obergefell (and Windsor) also indirectly bolsters a number of the themes. The
last part briefly explores some of the themes that can be drawn from this
67
collection of cases.
A. Protecting Children from Economic Harm
A key theme in the child-centered cases (and indirectly in Windsor and
Obergefell) is that government actors may not impede economic support to
68
children simply because of their status at birth. They reiterate that the
government cannot deny children access to basic economic building blocks—
access to benefits, access to routes to a legal parent–child relationship or access
to an education. These cases challenged the idea that some children are worthy
of economic safety nets and others are not simply because of they are the
69
children of adults who are characterized by government actors as “immoral.”
In fact, the Levy Court acknowledged that when dealing with social and
economic legislation, latitude was necessary. The Court then exercised its
latitude and struck the law withholding financial resources down because the
children “though illegitimate, were dependent on [the mother] . . . in her death
70
they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.”
Similarly, in a later nonmarital child case, New Jersey Welfare Rights
71
Organization v. Cahill, the Supreme Court again demonstrated a concern for
economic injury to children and found New Jersey’s Assistance to Families and
Working Poor program to be unconstitutional because it limited benefits only
to households comprised of opposite-sex married couples with “legitimate”
72
children. The Court found that the benefits under the welfare program were as
“indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate children as to the
73
health and well-being of those who are legitimate.” As explained in another
nonmarital status case, even when it comes to economic legislation, “[O]nce a
67. There are certainly other themes that are present as well. For example, Susannah Pollvogt and I
argued that this line of cases offers greater meaning to the equal protection guarantee of citizenship.
See Smith & Pollvogt, supra note 6, at 659.
68. As Professor Laurence Nolan stated in explaining the nonmarital status cases, “[E]qual
opportunity of economic support was impeded because of discrimination based on birth status.”
Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme Court from
Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U.L. REV. 1, 66
(1999).
69. See Nolan, supra note 68, at 25 (“Clearly, the result of these cases on behalf of children born
to unwed parents has been the transformation of law and policy regarding legitimacy and illegitimacy as
to economic rights, nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are constitutionally bound
to follow in regard to these children.”); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (quoting
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973)) (“[A] state may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.”).
70. Id. at 72.
71. N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 619 (quoting N.J. STAT. § 44:13-3(a) (West 1971)) (noting that New Jersey’s program
limited benefits to households “composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to
each other who have at least one minor child . . . of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the
other, or a child adopted by both . . .”).
73. Cahill, 411 U.S. at 621.
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state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed
support from their natural fathers there is no constitutional justification for
denying such an essential right to a child simply because is natural father had
74
not married its mother.”
Professor Laurence Nolan accurately explains that “the result of these cases
on behalf of children born to unwed parents has been the transformation of law
and policy regarding legitimacy and illegitimacy as to economic rights,
nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are constitutionally
75
bound to follow in regard to these children.” Importantly, the nonmarital cases
were not alone in raising the concern for unequal treatment for access to
economic resources.
While Levy and Weber focused on children denied access to economic
benefits, Plyler highlighted education’s link to economic sufficiency as a
concern on behalf of children of undocumented parents denied access to public
schools. Plyler explained that education is important for a number of reasons,
including that it provides the “basic tools by which individuals might lead
76
economically productive lives to benefit us all.”
Finally, in both Windsor and Obergefell, although failing to cite any legal
precedent on the treatment of children, the Supreme Court was especially
concerned with the economic impact that marriage bans had on children of
same-sex parents. In Windsor, the Court explained the financial injury the
federal marriage ban inflicted on children:
DOMA . . . brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of
health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their
workers’ same sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families 77upon
the loss of a spouse or parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.

Obergefell did the same, noting that children experience “material” and
78
psychological harm from marriage bans and nonrecognition laws.
The children’s rights cases offer much to explore for scholars and activists
seeking to understand the role of economic injury in the equal protection
guarantee.
B. Protecting Children from Stigmatic or Psychological Harms
In addition to an important consideration of economic harm, the childcentered cases have another persistent theme: seeking to guard against

74. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.
75. See Nolan, supra note 68, at 25 (“Clearly, the result of these cases on behalf of children born to
unwed parents has been the transformation of law and policy regarding legitimacy and illegitimacy as to
economic rights, nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are constitutionally bound to
follow in regard to these children.”); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (quoting Gomez
v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“[A] state may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate
children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.”)).
76. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
77. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
78. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
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psychological harm to children. This theme is influenced heavily by Brown,
which highlighted the adverse psychological effects of de jure segregation on
black children.
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone . . . Segregation of
white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
79
group.

Similarly, in Plyler, the Court described the effect of the law denying
children of undocumented parents access to an education as having an
“inestimable toll . . . on the social[,] economic, intellectual, and psychological
80
well-being of the individual.” Further, Windsor recognized DOMA’s psychic
and stigmatic harm to children of same-sex couples and the Court there
explained,
[I]t humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.
The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives . . . DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed
all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including
their own children, that
81
their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.

Obergefell reinforced this notion by viewing the psychological benefits of
82
marriage as even more profound than its material ones. These cases
demonstrate that both economic and psychological harms to children raise
equal protection concerns.
C. Protecting Children from Punishment for Matters beyond Their Control
A central tenet of equal protection law is that it is unfair to discriminate
against an individual because of a trait or characteristic derived at birth that
83
cannot be changed. Most lawyers think of the concept of immutability as
relevant to race-based equal protection cases; however, a persistent strand of
immutability stems from the child-centered cases. The Weber Court, citing a
number of cases including Brown, explained that “imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or

79. Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
81. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–96.
82. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
83. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (citing a number of cases
including Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (“the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined,
is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the
illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute
to society”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)).
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84

wrongdoing.” The Court was clear that it could not prevent the social
disapproval of children born outside of marriage; it could, however, “strike
85
down discriminatory laws relating to the status of birth.”
The early immutability concepts in the nonmarital status cases played an
important role in subsequent equal protection law. The Supreme Court
eventually relied on Weber’s immutability rationales to extend heightened
86
scrutiny for gender classifications.
Furthermore, the core principle against discrimination based on birth
characteristics was also prevalent in Plyler. These important themes from the
child-centered cases and Obergefell are worthy of further attention from
lawyers, jurists and legal scholars.
IV
CONCLUSION
Obergefell missed an opportunity to place children’s’ legal interests at the
center of an equal protection law claim. The government exclusion of children
of same-sex parents from the social, legal and economic benefits of marriage
because of the moral disdain of their parents’ relationships (and to incentivize
adult behavior) violated well-established equal protection law. Yet, there is
reason for optimism. Obergefell, when read in tandem with the omitted legal
precedent or the child-centered cases, could serve as an additional legal
building block to erect a more comprehensive children’s rights agenda.
Children’s interests should not be the collateral damage of their parents’ legal
and political losses, nor should children simply be the fortunate beneficiaries of
87
their parents’ wins. Rather, they should be able to vindicate their injuries
within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause in their own right.

84. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (“Because illegitimacy is
beyond the individual's control and bears ‘no relationship to the individual's ability to participate in
and contribute to society,’ . . . official discriminations resting on that characteristic are also subject to
somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions ‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent
they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.’”); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505 (stating that
status of illegitimacy “is like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within
the control of the illegitimate individual”); Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76.
85. Weber, 406 U.S. at 176 n. 14 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)).
86. Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (quoting Weber, for the proposition that “since sex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex would seem to violate the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility”). (internal
quotations omitted).
87. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600–01 (2015).

